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THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY-
ANTITRUST INTERFACE
Herbert Hovenkamp
*
This historical overview examines the relationship between antitrust policy and
intellectual property in the United States since 1890. Over most of this history, judges
imagined far greater conflicts between antitrust policyand intellectual property rights than
actually existed, or else relied on sweeping generalizations rather than close analysis. For
example, they often assumed that the presence of an intellectual property right led to
anticompetitive effects where there was no basis for finding any injury to competition at
all. At the other extreme, they often concluded that an intellectual property right
immunized seriously anticompetitive conduct even when the intellectual property statute
at issue did not authorize the challenged practice. True conflicts between antitrust and
intellectual property rights are relatively rare.
1. Introduction
The relation between intellectual property (IP) and antitrust policy has always been
unstable and problematic. Courts have seen an inherent conflict between the two legal
regimes.
1
While both sets of policies seek to promote economic welfare they do so in
different ways. In economics, antitrust is myopic. It looks mainly at the short run and
promotes practices that tend to drive prices toward cost, squeezing excess profits out of
the economy. In order to achieve this, antitrust develops rules that encourage entry and
duplication. As a general proposition, the more firms that offer a product the more
competitive will be its output and price.
By contrast, the policy of the IP laws is to take a longer view and encourage
innovation by giving people limited periods of exclusive rights, or freedom from
copying. In at least some situations, the result is that firms earn profits considerably
higher than short run costs, and IP rights have enabled a few firms to earn monopoly
profits for very long periods. The potential for conflict becomes even more pronounced
when IP right holders enter into agreements or engage in practices that are not expressly
authorized by the IP statutes but that seem to have anticompetitive effects.
Notwithstanding these differences in economic perspective, the conflict between IP
and antitrust law is easily exaggerated, and the courts have been too ready to find
conflicts where none existed. In order to have a true conflict, one must have both an IP
* University of Iowa.
1. E.g., SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1203 (2d Cir. 1981):
The conflict between the antitrust and patent laws arises in the methods they embrace that were
designed to achieve reciprocal goals. While the antitrust laws proscribe unreasonable restraints
of competition, the patent laws reward the inventor with a temporary monopoly that insulates
him from competitive exploitation of his patented art.
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practice that poses a real threat to competition and also a realistic argument that the
practice furthers an interest protected by the IP laws. Historically, many of the IP
practices condemned by courts as antitrust violations or anticompetitive “misuse” were
not anticompetitive at all. This was true of most of the tying and resale price
maintenance cases but also of some of the horizontal restraint and refusal-to-deal cases.
If competition is not significantly threatened by a practice, there is no IP-antitrust
conflict. Other practices have posed significant threats to competition but have not
furthered any interest that the IP laws were intended to protect. Once again, in such
cases there is no conflict.
2
In 1995 the Department of Justice Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade
Commission issued licensing guidelines that reflected this balance.
3
While the
Intellectual Property Guidelines are not analyzed here, it should be noted that they
served to move public policy away from the antitrust aggressiveness of the 1960s and
1970s
4
to a framework that focused on identifying serious threats to competition that
were not justified by explicit provisions of the IP laws. Another important institutional
development, not discussed here in any detail, was the creation of the Federal Circuit
Court of Appeals, whose exclusive appellate jurisdiction of claims arising under the
Patent Act has served to unify patent law and, to a lesser extent, antitrust rules applied in
cases where the primary claim arises under the Patent Act.
5
2. E.g., Walker Process Equip. v. FoodMach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965) (filing infringement
action based on fraudulently obtained patent).
3. U.S.DEP’TOFJUSTICE&FEDERALTRADECOMM’N, ANTITRUSTGUIDELINES FOR THELICENSINGOF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (1995), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 13,132 (1995). For
analysis, see 10 PHILLIP E. AREEDA, HERBERT HOVENKAMP& EINER ELHAUGE, ANTITRUST LAW
¶ 1782 (2d ed. 2004).
4. For example, see the list of “nine no-nos,” which the Antitrust Division promulgated in 1972. U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, Statement on Patent Licensing (Sept. 21, 1972), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep.
(CCH) ¶ 13,126. The list included (1) licenses requiring the purchase of unpatented products or
preventing the licensee from dealing in products outside the scope of the patent, (2) grantback
agreements requiring the licensee to assign back to the licensor any improvement patents developed by
the licensee, (3) restrictions on the resale of the patented product, (4) preventing the licensee from
dealing in products outside the scope of the patent, (5) agreements by licensors not to grant further
licenses to others, (6) mandatory package licenses, (7) royalty provisions not reasonably related to
sales, (8) restrictions on the licensee’s use of a product manufactured by a patented process, and (9)
resale price maintenance of licensed products.
Subsequent Justice Department statements issued prior to the 1995 Guidelines had already
repudiated many of the “no-nos.” See, e.g., Charles Rule, The Antitrust Implications of International
Licensing: After the Nine No-Nos (1986), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 13,131 (1995)
(“For each of the nine no-nos . . . there are at least as many potential procompetitive explanations” that
“in the great majority of cases . . . will outweigh any anticompetitive threat.”).
5. For further reading, see 1 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, MARK D. JANIS & MARK A. LEMLEY, IP AND
ANTITRUST: ANANALYSIS OFANTITRUSTPRINCIPLESAPPLIED TO INTELLECTUALPROPERTYLAW
ch. 5 (2001 & Supp. 2008); R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding?
An Empirical Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105 (2004);Glynn S. Lunney,
Jr., Patent Law, the Federal Circuit, and the Supreme Court: A Quiet Revolution, 11 SUP. CT. ECON.
REV. 1 (2004); Daniel J. Meador, Retrospective on the Federal Circuit: The First Twenty Years—A
Historical View, 11 FED. CIR. B.J. 557 (2002). See also Symposium on the Federal Circuit and
Antitrust, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 627 (2002).
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2. The shifting ground of the IP-antitrust relationship
This chapter takes a bird’s eye view of the most important themes that the courts
have seen as dominating the relationship between IP policy and antitrust policy. Current
law takes a relatively broad view of IP protection and a relatively narrow view of
antitrust. But this has not always been the case. The Supreme Court has gone through
periods in which it held expansive views of antitrust but was hostile toward patents and
inclined to view them as inherently anticompetitive. The result has been a great deal of
instability in antitrust-IP jurisprudence.
Ever since the antitrust laws were passed, antitrust and IP have had to accommodate
one another, but they have done so in different ways in different periods. The early
twentieth centurywas an era of IP expansion and antitrust accommodation. During this
period even when the Supreme Court saw fit to make IP yield, it frequently did so on
“misuse” rather than antitrust grounds. By contrast, beginning during theNewDeal and
extending through theWarren era, the Supreme Court wasmore inclined to view patents
as inherently anticompetitive and to interpret the antitrust laws expansively. The result
was overly aggressive and sometimes even silly antitrust rules, such as those for patent
ties, that found antitrust violations when the defendant had no real power and there was
no realistic prospect of economic harm.
Today, we once again live in an era of IP expansionism. Indeed, the IP laws,
particularly the Copyright Act, bear the marks of significant special interest capture.
The result is provisions that are much more likely to protect IP holders’ profits than to
serve the constitutional purpose of the IP laws, which is to encourage innovation by
searching for the right balance between the right to exclude and the need of every
innovator to build on the work of others.
6
By contrast, antitrust over the last three
decades has becomemuchmore focused on protecting consumerwelfare, neoclassically
defined, and interest groups have had considerably less success in obtaining special
interest legislation.
7
As a result, application of the antitrust laws is more likely to serve
6. For differing perspectives, see Herbert Hovenkamp, Restraints on Innovation, 29 CARDOZO L. REV.
247 (2007); Christina Bohannan, Copyright Harm and Fair Use, WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming
2008); HERBERT HOVENKAMP, United States Antitrust Policy in an Age of IP Expansion, in
INTERNATIONALANTITRUSTLAWANDPOLICY 225 (2004 FordhamCorp. L. Inst., BarryE.Hawk ed.,
2005); LAWRENCELESSIG, FREECULTURE: HOWBIGMEDIAUSESTECHNOLOGY AND THELAWTO
LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY (2004); LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF
IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD (2001); Robert P. Merges, One
Hundred Years of Solicitude: Intellectual Property Law, 1900-2000, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2187, 2235
(2000); Adam B. Jaffe, The U.S. Patent System in Transition: Policy Innovation and the Innovation
Process, 29 RES. POLICY 531 (2000); JARED DIAMOND, GUNS, GERMS & STEEL: THE FATE OF
HUMAN SOCIETIES ch. 13 (1999); Stephen G. Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of
Copyright in Books, Photocopies and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281 (1970).
7. To be sure, there are exceptions. The Robinson-Patman Act is certainly the most significant instance
of special interest capture contained in the antitrust laws. See 14 HERBERTHOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST
LAW ch. 23 (2d ed. 2006). There are also numerous statutory exemptions from the antitrust laws,
many of which reflect strenuous special interest lobbying. One recent example is an antitrust
immunity for graduate medical school resident matching programs, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 37b(b)(2).
See Jung v. Ass’n of Am. Med. Colls., 339 F. Supp. 2d 26, 34 (D.D.C. 2004). On other federal
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the public interest than application of at least many IP provisions. This counsels against
overly expansive interpretations of IP rights in the face of serious complaints of
competitive harm.
At the policy level, antitrust is a more coherent enterprise than the IP regimes. While
the point can certainly be exaggerated, the fact is that the neoclassical model of
competition has become robustly established in both the antitrust academy and the
federal judiciary. Courts have become far better at distinguishing anticompetitive
practices from those that are procompetitive or harmless. While plenty of problems of
administration remain, most of them have to do with the details of antitrust enforcement
rather than its core policy.
8
IP policy cannot make the same set of claims. Most
importantly, it lacks an empirically useable model for identifying the appropriate
duration and scope of IP rights. An optimal IP policy
9
would seek to maximize the
social returns from innovation, less the costs of any monopoly output reductions and
related dislocations that result, plus the costs of using the IP system, including the costs
of identifying IP rights and negotiating licenses.
10
Determining the optimal amount of
protection is incredibly difficult. For example, as the scope and strength of IP rights
increases, people have a greater incentive to innovate insofar as anticipated returns to
completed innovations are greater, but a reduced incentive insofar as it becomes more
costly to borrow the ideas of others. Further, while the IP statutes are largely general,
optimal coverage almost certainly varies from industry to industry. For example, a
shorter period of copyright protection for computer code would almost certainly further
innovation in that market. The market life of computer code is a few years at the most.
Under the current regime, there is no realistic chance that copyrighted code will ever
enter the public domain while it has economic life remaining. Largely because of this
uncertainty,
11
the IP laws have become a playground for special interests, who have
remarkable and generally unprecedented control over congressional agendas.
12
exemptions from the antitrust laws, see 1A PHILLIPE.AREEDA&HERBERTHOVENKAMP,ANTITRUST
LAW ¶¶ 240-257 (3d ed. 2007).
8. See HERBERTHOVENKAMP, THEANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION (2006).
9. Such a policy is not merely economically optimal, it is also implicitlymandated by the IP clause of the
Constitution, which authorizes Congress to make IP laws in order “[t]o promote the Progress of
Science and the Useful Arts.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
10. See generally WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW ch. 1 (2003).
11. In general, the greater the uncertainty about the efficient way to manage amarket, themore susceptible
that market will be to regulatory capture. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Regulation History as Politics or
Markets, 12 YALE J. REG. 549 (1995).
12. Speaking of copyright, see, e.g., WilliamF. Patry, Copyright and the Legislative Process: A Personal
Perspective, 14 CARDOZOARTS& ENT. L.J. 139, 141 (1996):
Copyright interest groups hold fund raisers for members of Congress, write campaign songs,
invite members of Congress (and their staff) to private movie screenings or sold out concerts,
and draft legislation they expect Congress to pass without any changes. In the 104th Congress,
they are drafting the committee reports and haggling among themselves about what needs to be
in the report. In my experience, some copyright lawyers and lobbyists actually resent members
of Congress and staff interfering with what they view as their legislation and their committee
report. With the 104th Congress we have, I believe, reached a point where legislative history
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Of course, special interest capture of IP regimes is not a problem to be addressed
under the antitrust laws, but rather by educating Congress and convincing courts to take
legislative capture into account when interpreting statutes.
13
At the same time, however,
the current regime of unduly expansionist IP provisions and a decently grounded
antitrust policy suggest that antitrust should not be as cautious as it has been in the past.
When a challenged practice poses a true threat to competition and is not expressly
permitted by the IP statutes, courts are well advised to err on the side of promoting the
short-run competitive interests recognized in antitrust, rather than the cacophony of
voices reflected in the IP laws.
3. Earliest IP-antitrust encounters: “First sale” limitations
and resale price maintenance
Even before the Sherman Act was passed, the Supreme Court had used IP doctrine
itself to strike down license provisions viewed as unnecessarily restricting competition in
the sale of affected goods. For example, Adams v. Burke (1873) applied the “first sale”
doctrine to preclude a patentee from imposing territorial restrictions on patented goods
once the licensee had sold them.
14
While a patentee might lawfully limit the territories in
which a licensee produced the patented article, once the article was sold the patentee no
longer controlled it and could not stipulate where it could be marketed. Adamswas thus
the first case to strike down a vertical territorial division agreement, nearly 20 years prior
to the passage of the Sherman Act, and 90 years prior to its application in the Schwinn
decision.
15
In its 1908 Bobbs-Merrill decision, the Court once again applied the first sale
doctrine so as to prevent resale price maintenance, or publisher stipulation of the price at
which its books must be resold by booksellers.
16
The case raised no antitrust issues but
found that the protections of the copyright laws did not extend to controlling the price of a
copyrightedwork once the copyright holder had sold it. The Court expressly left open the
question, later resolved in the Dr. Miles decision, whether the sale of the book plus a
separate contractual provision stipulating the resale price would be enforceable
17
—thus
must be ignored because not even the hands of congressional staff have touched committee
reports.
13. On this point, see Frank H. Easterbrook, The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4
(1984), and Einer Elhauge, Preference-Eliciting Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 2162
(2002). On patents, see Dan L. Burk &Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L.REV.
1575 (2003); on copyright, see Christina Bohannan,ReclaimingCopyright, 23CARDOZOARTS&ENT.
L. J. 567 (2006).
14. Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. 453 (1873). See also Keeler v. Standard Folding Bed Co., 157 U.S. 659
(1895), which held that under the first sale doctrine a dealer in a territory given to a licensee could
resell the product in a territory reserved by the patentee itself, and thus in competition with the
patentee.
15. See United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967) (declaring vertically imposed
territorial restrictions unlawful per se). Schwinn was overruled by Continental T.V. v. GTE Sylvania
Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977), which imposed a rule of reason. See 8 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1643 (2d ed. 2004).
16. Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908).
17. See id. at 350 (“there is no claim in this case of [a] contract limitation . . . controlling the subsequent
sales of the book”).
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first suggesting the concept of a “shrinkwrap” license that gave the licensor contractual
rights beyond the rights recognized in the IP statutes themselves.
18
Three years after Bobbs-Merrill, the Supreme Court found resale price maintenance
by contract to be unlawful under the antitrust laws in Dr. Miles, and in the process it
rejected an IP defense—namely, that the medicines whose prices were fixed were
protected by trade secrets. WhileDr. Miles per se rule against resale price maintenance
has now been overruled, this particular doctrine remains unchanged.
19
Dr.Miles argued
that the “secret process” by which its medicine was manufactured gave it an additional
interest entitling it to specify resale prices. The medicine was not patented, but even if it
had been it would not have been protected under the rule already stated in Bement and
subsequently developed inGeneral Electric
20
permitting a patentee to stipulate the price
at which goods manufactured under its license are sold. In Dr. Miles the defendant
manufactured the medicine itself and sold it to resellers, thus taking it out of first sale
protection. As then Judge Horace Lurton wrote in his opinion for the Sixth Circuit, to
enforce the resale price maintenance agreement for Dr. Miles medicine would give the
producer of a nonpatented product “vastly more far-reaching” protection of the right to
control resales than the owner of a patented product has.
21
Further:
The mere fact that one article or class of articles is made under an unknown and private
formula and another class is not is an undeniable fact which may serve for some purposes
to differentiate them. But that single fact does not afford an economic reason, and still
less a legal reason, for saying that it operates to exempt such articles from rules against
unlawful restraints of trade.
22
Since Dr. Miles, the courts have more or less consistently held that the resale price
maintenance rule applies categorically, whether or not a good is produced by a secret
process, and whether or not it is patented,
23
copyrighted,
24
or trademarked.
25
18. See, e.g., Bowers v. Baystate Techs., 320 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2003); ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86
F.3d 1447, 39 USPQ.2d 1161 (7th Cir. 1996); Christina Bohannan,Copyright Preemption of Contract,
MD. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008); Justin Graham, Preserving the Aftermarket in Copyrighted Works:
Adapting the First Sale Doctrine to the Emerging Technological Landscape, 2002 STAN. TECH. L.
REV. 1.
19. Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 400-01 (1911), overruled by Leegin
Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705 (2007). See also Bauer & Cie v. O’Donnell,
229 U.S. 1 (1913), which held that the Patent Act’s exclusive right to “make, use, and vend” (35
U.S.C. § 40) did not include the right to impose resale price maintenance via a license agreement;
noting the connection with Dr. Miles (antitrust) and Bobbs-Merrill (copyright). Accord Straus v.
Victor Talking Mach. Co., 243 U.S. 490 (1917) (decided entirely under Patent Act). On the great
pharmacy price-fixing conspiracy that gave rise to theDr.Miles litigation, seeHERBERTHOVENKAMP,
ENTERPRISE ANDAMERICAN LAW, 1836-1937 ch. 25 (1991).
20. E. Bement & Sons v. Nat’l HarrowCo., 186 U.S. 70 (1902); United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 272 U.S.
476 (1926). See infra Section 5.
21. Dr. Miles, 164 F. 803, 806 (6th Cir. 1908), aff’d, 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
22. Id. at 806-07.
23. Bauer & Cie v. O’Donnell, 229 U.S. 1 (1913).
24. Bauer, 229 U.S. at 12-13 (dictum); Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908).
25. United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967).
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4. Patent ties and the rise of misuse doctrine
26
The law of tying arrangements became the stage for one of the most significant
encounters of IP and competition policy. On one side of the conflict was the claim of
patent holders that they should be given maximum freedom to capitalize on inventions
by bundling unpatented supplies or other goods used in conjunction with the patent. On
the other side was the competitive concern that such bundling expanded the patent
“monopoly” without authorization in the Patent Act.
The early doctrine of patent “misuse” evolved in the first decades of the twentieth
century, a little prior to the development of the earliest antitrust law of tying
arrangements.
27
The earliest cases are best described as pre-misuse, because they all
involved actions to enforce license restrictions that infringement defendants claimed
were anticompetitive. Not until the 1940s did the Court refuse a direct patent
enforcement action against an obvious infringer because of patentee behavior that the
Court characterized as misuse.
28
Why separate doctrines of misuse and antitrust grew up is something of a mystery.
One explanation for later cases, after the 1950s, is that notwithstanding antitrust
expansionism the Supreme Court viewed tying law as insufficient when the
arrangements involved patented products or processes. The doctrine ofmisuse provided
an extra measure of deterrence in such situations. But this does not explain why earlier
decisions such as Motion Picture Patents relied on misuse principles when illegality,
and thus nonenforceability, under the Clayton Act seemed so clear.
There were always technical differences between misuse and antitrust doctrine.
Misuse was most generally raised as a defense to an infringement action, while the
antitrust laws were affirmatively enforced by the government or, occasionally, private
plaintiffs. But infringement defendants and courts could just as easily have held that
infringement actions could not be based on licensing arrangements that violated the
antitrust laws. Even at common law, agreements that restrained trade were
unenforceable. Already in its 1922 Standard Fashion decision the Supreme Court had
taken that approach with respect to exclusive dealing, holding that an exclusive contract
imposed on retailers by the market dominating seller of dress patterns could not be
enforced because it violated Section 3 of the Clayton Act.
29
The courts did not follow
the same course in the patent tie cases, however, and the doctrine of misuse acquired a
life of its own, creating broader tying liability than the antitrust laws themselves did, and
later expanding beyond tying arrangements to include other types of licensing
provisions.
The lower courts began dealing with patent ties in the 1890s, and largely approved
them. The rise of misuse doctrine resulted from the fact that in the beginning courts
26. On patent ties, see Janet McDavid, Eric Lobenfeld, Erica Mintzer & Minda Schechter, Patents and
Tying Arrangements, which appears as Chapter 81 in this book.
27. See HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 5, at ch. 3.
28. Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942). See infra text accompanying notes 52-56.
29. Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 258 U.S. 346 (1922).
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analyzed these ties strictly under the policies of the Patent Act, not antitrust law.
30
The
first patent-tie case to come to the Supreme Court was Henry in 1912.
31
A.B. Dick
manufactured a mimeograph machine for offices, on which it held several patents. It
placed a notice of a license restriction on the machine, stating that the machine “may be
used only with the stencil paper, ink and other supplies made by A.B. Dick Co.”
32
The
patent act neither expressly permitted nor expressly forbad a patentee fromconditioning
the use of its patent on the purchase of unpatented complementary goods. Further, in
this case at least some of the goods were ordinary supplies capable of substantial
noninfringing uses. Nevertheless, the Court approved a finding of contributory
infringement by the defendant, who sold some of the covered supplies with the
knowledge that they would be used by a purchaser in violation of the license
restriction.
33
Although the case arose two decades after the Sherman Act was passed,
the infringement defendant did not raise an antitrust defense to A.B. Dick’s
arrangement. The Court mentioned the Sherman Act briefly, but concluded that it did
not apply.
34
Rather it simply noted that the license restriction was not forbidden by the
Patent Act. The defendant had argued that the tie served to expand the monopoly
created by the patent.
35
The Patent Act did not expressly forbid such contracts,
however, and the Court held that “[a]rguments based on suggestions of public policy not
recognized in the patent law are not relevant.”
36
Congress was not happy with the Henry decision, and two years latter it passed
Section 3 of the Clayton Act, which condemned anticompetitive ties involving patented
as well as unpatented goods.
37
Three years after that the Court overruled A. B. Dick in
the Motion Picture Patents Co. (MPPC) case.
38
The most successful patents in the
motion picture industry had been developed by Thomas Edison, whose projection
technology used sprocketed wheels and perforated film to make motion pictures run
smoothly without slipping. The Edison interests had initially hoped to obtain control
over the entire motion picture industry by refusing to sell patented cameras used for
taking the pictures. When competitive cameras appeared on the market the parties
30. See, e.g., Heaton Peninsula Button Fastening Co. v. Eureka Specialty Co., 77 F. 288 (6th Cir. 1896)
(finding contributory infringement by one who sold staples for fastening shoe buttons to the owner of
the patentee’s buttoning fastening machine, in violation of a license restriction that only the patentee’s
staples could be used; relying entirely on Patent Act); see also Tubular Rivet & Stud Co. v. O’Brien,
93 F. 200 (D.Mass. 1898) (patented riveting machine and unpatented rivets); Cortelyou v. Lowe, 111
F. 1005 (2d Cir. 1901) (per curiam) (patented copying machine and unpatented supplies); Cortelyou v.
Carter’s Ink Co., 118 F. 1022 (S.D.N.Y. 1902) (copying machine and ink); BrodrickCopygraphCo. v.
Roper, 124 F. 1019 (D.R.I. 1903) (same); Aeolian Co. v. HarryH. Juelg Co., 155 F. 119 (2dCir. 1907)
(patented player piano and music rolls); Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. Brooklyn Bottle Stopper Co., 172
F. 225, 230 (E.D.N.Y. 1909) (patented bottle-handling machine and bottle caps; expressly finding no
violation of antitrust laws).
31. Henry v. A. B. Dick & Co., 224 U.S. 1 (1912).
32. Id. at 11.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 28-29.
35. Id. at 19.
36. Id.
37. 15 U.S.C. § 14.
38. Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917).
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litigated numerous patent infringement suits, which they finally settled by forming the
Motion Picture Patents Company in 1909. That firm then shifted its strategy to one of
tying its patented projectors to films. MPPC obtained an exclusive supply contract for
film fromKodak, and also placed on its patented projectors a license restriction that only
its own films could be shown through the machine. Finally, MPCC organized the
General Film Company, which acquired most of the distribution network, made up at
this time of small firms that purchased the films from their makers and then licensed
them to theaters. The General Film Company then refused to rent films to theaters that
either used projectors made by others or that showed other producers’ films. TheMPPC
interests also attempted to blacklist actors and actresses who had agreed towork for film
companies that were not controlled by MPPC. Significantly, the overall arrangement
was horizontal as well as vertical because MPPC itself was a consortium of otherwise
competing firms producing motion picture technology.
39
While Section 3 of the Clayton Act was clearly the occasion for the overruling of
Henry, and the Court stated that the new statute “confirmed” its analysis, the decision
itself rested on patent law rather than antitrust grounds.
40
The Court held that because
the film was “no part” of the grant of a patent in the machine, it could not be
infringement for the licensee to use the film of others. The Court saw the patentee as “in
effect, extend[ing] the scope of its patent monopoly by restricting the use of it to
materials necessary in its operation, but which are not part of the patented invention.”
41
The Court’s reliance on the Patent Act andmisuse principles rather than Section 3 of
the Clayton Act directly is odd. The legislative history of the provision expressly
targeted the activities of MPPC and the General Film Company:
Where the concern making these contracts is already great and powerful, such as the
United Shoe Machinery Co., the American Tobacco Co., and the General Film Co., the
exclusive or “tying” contract made with local dealers becomes one of the greatest
agencies and instrumentalities of monopoly ever devised by the brain of man. It
completely shuts out competitors, not only from trade in which they are already engaged,
but from the opportunities to build up trade in any community where these great and
powerful combinations are operating under this system and practice . . . . The General
Film Co. . . . has practically destroyed all competition and acquired a virtual monopolyof
all films manufactured and sold in the United States.
42
Congress’s concerns as manifested in Section 3 of the Clayton Act provided the
Supreme Court with an important rationale for developing patentmisuse doctrine, albeit
39. See LEWIS JACOBS, THE RISE OF THE AMERICAN FILM 8, 81-85, 88, 164-65, 291-92 (1939);
BENJAMINB.HAMPTON, AHISTORYOFTHEMOVIES 8-11, 17-24, 34, 64-76, 79-81 (1931);MICHAEL
CONANT, ANTITRUST IN THEMOTIONPICTURE INDUSTRY 16-21, 77-80 (1960). For briefer treatment
of the history, focusing on misuse and antitrust issues, see 9 AREEDA&HOVENKAMP, supra note 15,
¶ 1701.
40. MPPC, 243 U.S. at 516-18:
Our conclusion renders it unnecessary to make the application of this statute to the case at bar
which the circuit court of appeals made of it, but it must be accepted by us as a most persuasive
expression of the public policy of our country with respect to the question before us.
41. MPPC, 243 U.S. at 517.
42. H.R. REP. NO. 63-627, 2d Sess. 12-13 (1914).
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as an alternative to direct enforcement of Section 3 itself or use of it as a defense.
Indeed, for the subsequent three decades ties involving patented tying products were
condemned mainly under patent doctrine rather than the antitrust laws. In Carbice the
Supreme Court once again denied a contributory infringement action to the patentee of
an ice box whose license restriction required users to purchase its dry ice as well.
43
Carbice, the infringement defendant, had sold dry ice to owners of ice boxes
manufactured by the plaintiff, “with knowledge that the dioxide is to be used by the
purchaser in the transportation packages like those described in the patent.”
44
The
decision was an extension of Motion Picture Patents, which had involved a patented
projector and unpatented films. Carbice, by contrast, involved a combination patent,
and one of the elements of the combination was the otherwise unpatented dry ice. While
the Court foundmisuse, it also declared in a footnote that the tying arrangement violated
Section 3 of the Clayton Act and stated that it was “analogous” to a Sherman Act
Section 1 violation.
45
The Carbice proposition—that the owner of a combination patent did not have the
right under the Patent Act to control the sale of unpatented consumables described in the
combination patent claims—was later extended in the Supreme Court’sMercoid case to
durable components of a combination patent as well. And in Leitch the same rule was
extended to a process patent.
46
The defendant owned a patent on a process licensed to
road builders for applying an emulsion. Bymeans of a license provision it attempted to
tie the unpatented emulsion used in the process. All of these cases relied mainly on
misuse doctrine, although theMercoid decisions also indicated that the license tie would
violate the antitrust laws.
47
The principal exceptions to the Supreme Court’s nearly exclusive pre-1940s reliance
on misuse rather than antitrust doctrine to explore the legality of tying arrangements
came in two cases brought by the government. In the 1922United ShoeMachinery case
the Supreme Court rejected the defendant’s claim that Section 3 of the Clayton Act was
unconstitutional because it took away rights that had previously been held to be
encompassed by the Patent Act.
48
The Court relied heavily on its MPPC decision to
hold that, while the Patent Act did create the power to exclude rivals from making the
patented invention, it did not confer the power to tie unpatented articles; so the Clayton
Act took nothing away. Then in the IBM case (1936) the Court held that Clayton
Section 3 could be applied to the defendant’s tie of tabulating machines and blank data
cards, notwithstanding IBM’s claim that its patent rights extended to both the tabulating
machines and the cards. The Court interpreted the patent claims to cover only the cards
when perforated and the perforation process. It then rejected the “dubious claim that the
43. Carbice Corp. v. Am. Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27 (1931).
44. Id. at 30.
45. Id. at 32-33 & n.4.
46. Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co. (Mercoid I), 320 U.S. 661 (1943); Mercoid Corp. v.
Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co. (Mercoid II), 320 U.S. 680, 684 (1944); Leitch Mfg. Co. v.
Barber Co., 302 U.S. 458, 461-63 (1938).
47. See Mercoid I, 320 U.S. at 667-68;Mercoid II, 320 at 684. The Carbice and Leitch decisions never
mention the antitrust laws.
48. United Shoe Mach. Corp. v. United States, 258 U.S. 451 (1922).
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sale of the unpunched cards is a contributory infringement . . . . ”
49
The Court then went
on to condemn the tie using misuse criteria, with no discussion of market power other
than the assumption that the patents in question conferred amonopoly.
50
In sum, for all
intents and purposes IBMwas a misuse case in which the misuse claim was brought by
the government rather than raised as a defense to an infringement action, and the vehicle
for so doing was Section 3 of the Clayton Act.
51
The Supreme Court’s 1942 Morton Salt decision is sometimes viewed as first
developing the modern misuse concept because for the first time the Court denied an
infringement action against a direct (rather than contributory) infringer.
52
The
previously discussed decisions simply stated that licenses containing tying clauseswere
unenforceable because they attempted to extend the patent grant beyond its
congressional authorization. The patentee in Morton Salt had invented a machine that
injected salt tablets into canned foods, and licensed the machine to canners under
agreements requiring them to purchase their salt from the patentee as well. The
infringement defendant had built a machine that almost certainly infringed the plaintiff’s
patent, but the Supreme Court held that as long as the patentee was engaged in the
impermissible tying it could not sustain the infringement action against a rival. While
antitrust arguments were presented to the court as well, it concluded that it need not
address the antitrust issue because “maintenance of the present suit to restrain
petitioner’s manufacture or sale of the alleged infringing machine is contrary to public
policy.”
53
49. IBM Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131, 137-38 (1936).
50. Other government-brought decisions addressed ties under § 3 of the Clayton Act, without discussing
patents. E.g., FTC v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 261 U.S. 463 (1923) (refusing to condemn tying in gasoline
because the contracts did not also require exclusive dealing; no discussion of IP rights).
51. IBM, 298 U.S. at 137-38. Indeed, the Court described the Clayton Act provision almost as if it were an
amendment to the Patent Act, rather than an antitrust provision:
When Congress had before it the bill which became section 3 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.A.
§ 14, it was familiar with the decision of this Court in Henry v. A. B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, and
with the contentions made inUnited States v. United ShoeMach. Co., 247 U.S. 32, 33, 38 S. Ct.
473, 62 L. Ed. 968, then pending before this Court; cases in which it was held that a tying clause
could lawfully be extended to unpatented supplies for a leased patented machine. Cong.Rec.,
vol. 51, part 14, 63rd Cong., 2d Sess., 14,089 ff.; see Henderson, The Federal Trade
Commission, 30. One purpose of section 3 undoubtedly was to prevent such use of the tying
clause . . . . But the debates on section 3, on the floor of the Senate, disclose that it was well
known to that body that one of the contentions in the pending cause, United States v. United
Shoe Mach. Co., 247 U.S. 32, 33, 38 S. Ct. 473, 62 L. Ed. 968, was that it was permissible, in
any circumstances, for a lessor to tie several patented articles together. They show that the
proponents of the bill were as much concerned that that practice should be prohibited as that the
tying of nonpatented to patented articles should be ended.
Id. at 137.
52. Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942).
53. Id. at 494. The Seventh Circuit had allowed the infringement claim after concluding that use of the
patent had not substantially lessened competition in violation of the antitrust laws, mainly because
there was no foreclosure in the salemarket: “the extent of the influence of the agreement upon the salt
business [was] almost nil.” Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 117 F.2d 968, 971 (7th Cir. 1941).
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The court also relied on the equitable doctrine of “unclean hands,” which denied an
equitable remedy in cases where the plaintiff was also violating public policy or
engaging in inequitable conduct. “‘[E]quity does not demand that its suitors shall have
led blameless lives,’” but “the successful prosecution of an infringement suit . . . is a
powerful aid to the maintenance of the attempted monopoly of the unpatented article.”
54
Accordingly, all relief was denied against alleged infringement “at least until it has been
made to appear that the improper practice has been abandoned and the consequences of
themisuse of the patent have been dissipated.”
55
Significantly, while the court stated the
concern as being competition in the tied-up salt market, that tying agreement had no
impact whatsoever on the infringement defendant in this case.
56
One explanation for the dominance of misuse over antitrust analysis during this
period is the happenstance that the private cases were infringement actions in which the
claimant was an infringement defendant. Even so, nonenforcement of license
restrictions that violated an antitrust provision would seem to be a much more obvious
solution, and one that would not have involved the courts in developing distinct sets of
principles for misuse and antitrust.
57
Only in the 1940s did the Supreme Court begin to develop distinctive antitrust
doctrine in tying cases involving patented articles. In its twoMercoid decisions, decided
in 1943 and 1944, the Supreme Court first held that the owner of a combination patent
could not maintain an infringement action against one who sold an unpatented element
of the combination under circumstances where there were no noninfringing uses of the
element.
58
The technology at issue was a patented device that combined a thermostat, an
electric switch, and a corkscrew style stoker that fed coal into furnaces. The switch
itself was unpatented but useful only in this particular patented combination. Mercoid
thus effectively held that it was unlawful for a firm with a combination patent to insist
on selling all elements of the combination itself when the separate element in question
was unpatented. The firstMercoid decision was unclear about whether the Court was
applying misuse or antitrust principles. However, a year later the Court sustained a
declaratory judgment action to the effect that the same conduct violated the antitrust
laws.
59
In the process it held, apparently inconsistently with Morton Salt, that
54. 314 U.S. at 492-93.
55. Id.; see also B.B. Chem. Co. v. Ellis, 31 U.S. 495, 498 (1942) (patentee could enforce patent once
again, after it ceased the offending practice). Although the doctrine initially barred only equity suits, a
few years later the Supreme Court extended it to actions for damages or royalties. United States
Gypsum Co. v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 352 U.S. 457, 465 (1957).
56. See id. at 491: “[N]othing turns on the fact that petitioner also competes with respondent in the sale of
the tablets.” Id. “It is the adverse effect upon the public interest of a successful infringement suit in
conjunction with the patentee’s course of conduct which disqualifies him to maintain the suit,
regardless of whether the particular [infringer] has suffered from the misuse of the patent.” Id. at 494.
57. See, e.g., Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 258 U.S. 346 (1922).
58. Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1943).
59. Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 680 (1944). The suit was brought
under the Declaratory Judgment Act, apparently because the patentee had merely threatened the
declaratory judgment plaintiff with an infringement action for selling the switch; however, the plaintiff
also requested treble damages, which were available only under the antitrust laws.
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[t]he legality of any attempt to bring unpatented goods within the protection of the patent
is measured by the anti-trust laws not by the patent law . . . . [T]he effort here made to
control competition in this unpatented device plainly violates the anti-trust laws . . . .”
60
There was no discussion of market power or separate products—two elements that
are now essential parts of tying analysis.
Then, beginning with the 1947 decision in International Salt the Supreme Court
began to develop the modern antitrust jurisprudence of tying, which declared such
arrangements to be unlawful per se when there was tying product power and “not
insubstantial” sales of the tied product in commerce. Further, sufficient powerwould be
presumedwhen the tying product was patented.
61
That presumption has been the object
of rigorous criticism and even ridicule. Nevertheless, in 2005 it was reluctantly
accepted by the Federal Circuit, which saw no way to avoid the Supreme Court
precedents upholding it.
62
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed,
63
overruling both International Salt and
dicta in its 1962 Loew’s decision that was willing to presume that a patent in a tying
product created sufficient market power to make the tie unlawful.
64
TheCourt observed
that over the years its hostility toward tying arrangements had “substantially
diminished,” and that along with this reduced concern about anticompetitive effects
came increasing insistent that market power be explicitly proven.
65
In assessing an
explicit market power requirement for patent misuse, Congress had indicated that it was
moving in the same direction.
66
Taking these judgments together, the Court concluded
that ties involving patented products should be evaluated under the same standards as
nonpatent ties:
60. Id. at 684. This holding was severely criticized in the REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S
NATIONALCOMMITTEE TOSTUDY THEANTITRUSTLAWS 254 (1955), which attacked the notion “that
any violation of patent law necessarily violates the antitrust laws,” and declared that a misuse defined
by patent policy is often “effectively curbed” by simply denying the patentee equitable relief and is not
always “drastic enough to meet antitrust prerequisites of effect on competition.” Moreover, making
every patent misuse an antitrust violation would “put the patent owner on a different footing than
owners of other property subject to antitrust.” In 1952 the holding was overruled by Congress. 35
U.S.C. § 271(c)-(d). The amending statute provided that a person selling articles (other than a staple
suitable for substantial noninfringing uses) for use in infringing a patented invention, with knowledge
thereof, is liable as a contributory infringer. It also declared that a patentee shall not be denied relief to
which he is otherwise entitled merely because he sells goods for use in practicing the patented
invention, licenses others to do so, or enforces his rights against infringement or contributory
infringement. See 10 AREEDA ET AL., supra note 3, ¶¶ 1742-1743.
61. Int’l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
62. Indep. Ink v. Ill. Tool Works, 396 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2005), rev’d and remanded, 126 S. Ct. 1281
(2006). Under the holding the presumption is rebuttable. Further, the court held that in assessing
market power one should look at the usual criteria for assessing power, such as market definition,
market share, and entry barriers. However, the burden of proof would be on the defendant rather than
the plaintiff. See PHILLIPE.AREEDA&HERBERTHOVENKAMP,ANTITRUSTLAW ¶ 518 (3d ed. 2008).
63. Ill. Tool Works v. Indep. Ink, 126 S. Ct. 1281 (2006).
64. United States v. Loew’s, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 45 (1962).
65. Illinois Tool Works, 126 S. Ct. at 1286.
66. Id. at 1290 (citing and quoting the 1988 Patent Misuse Reform Act, 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(5)).
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While some such arrangements are still unlawful, such as those that are the product of a
true monopoly or a marketwide conspiracy,
67
that conclusion must be supported by proof
of power in the relevant market rather than by a mere presumption thereof.
68
After International Salt the antitrust laws began to displace misuse doctrine as the
principal vehicle for attacking tying arrangements,
69
although misuse continued to play
an important role. As overly aggressive as tying law under the per se rule became, some
courts nevertheless continued to find misuse in order tomake ultimate liability for patent
ties even broader.
70
Congress also intervened by passing the PatentMisuse ReformAct
in 1988, which declared that patent ties should be misuse only when the patentee had
power in the patented invention in question.
71
One clear purpose of the statute was to
bring the substantive requirements for misuse and antitrust closer together.
72
Over the last several decades, the principal function ofmisuse in tying cases has been
to extend tying doctrine into areas where tying law itself might not reach. Themostwell
known example is the Supreme Court’s conclusion in Brulotte that it is per semisuse for
a patentee to require royalty payments that extend beyond the expiration date of the
patent—a conclusion it reached by likening the extension of royalty payments to the
extension of patent power that results from the tie of unpatented goods.
73
Other
67. Citing United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 145-46 (1948).
68. Illinois Tool Works, 126 S. Ct. at 1291. The Court noted that the “vast majority” of the academic
literature on the subject had urged this result, citing 10 AREEDA ET AL., supra note 3, ¶ 1737a; 1
HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 5, at § 4.2a; LANDES& POSNER, supra note 10, at 374; Kenneth J.
Burchfiel, Patent Misuse and Antitrust Reform: “Blessed be the Tie?”, 4 HARV. J.L. &TECH. 1, 57 &
n.340 (1991).
69. For example, Northern Pacific Railway v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958), extended the same
aggressiveness to a situationwhere the tying productwas not patented, andTimes-Picayune Publishing
Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 614 (1952), articulated the requirement of separate products. See
10 AREEDA ET AL., supra note 3, ¶¶ 1742-1743.
70. See, for example, Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, 395 U.S. 100, 140-41 (1969), which
suggested that misuse could be broader than Sherman or Clayton Act liability. As a result the
challenged practices, which included compulsory package licensing of groups of patents, and basing
royalties on the production of unpatented articles, could be unlawful even in the absence of market
power or competitive effects:
And if there was such patent misuse, it does not necessarily follow that the misuse embodies the
ingredients of a violation of either §1 or §2 of the ShermanAct, or that Zenithwas threatened by
a violation so as to entitle it to an injunction under §16 of the Clayton Act.
71. The Patent Misuse Reform Act provides that:
No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement or contributory infringement of a
patent shall be denied relief or deemed guilty of misuse or illegal extension of the patent right
by reason of his having . . . (4) refused to license or use any rights to the patent; or (5)
conditioned the license of any rights to the patent or the sale of the patented product on the
acquisition of a license to rights in another patent or purchase of a separate product, unless, in
view of the circumstances, the patent owner has market power in the relevant market for the
patent or patented product on which the license or sale is conditioned.
35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(4)-(5).
72. See 10 AREEDA ET AL., supra note 3, ¶ 1781d3.
73. Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964); see 1 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 5, at ch. 23; see also
Scheiber v. Dolby Labs., 293 F.3d 1014 (7th Cir. 2002) (Posner, adhering to but severely criticizing
Brulotte, and suggesting that Supreme Court overrule it).
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examples are the Federal Circuit’s conclusion that the tying of patented and unpatented
goodsmight constitute misuse even when tying law’s “separate products” requirement is
not met.
74
Other courts have held that misuse could be found on tying-like practices,
even when no anticompetitive effects were apparent, or when other technical
requirements of the antitrust law of tying were not met.
75
In its USM decision, however, the Seventh Circuit concluded that patent misuse
should generally limited to practices that violate the antitrust laws as well.
76
The claim
at issue only vaguely resembled tying. The patentee’s license required payment of 25
percent of royalties received fromsublicensees generally; however, for four sublicensees
that had previously been the patentee’s own licensees it required a payment of 75
percent.
77
The higher royalty may have been punishment for licensees who no longer
dealt with the patentee directly, but it was hard to see how the differential royalty
schedule could be exclusionary. Judge Richard Posner concluded that the practice could
not be misuse without a showing of market power or competitive effects because
antitrust law would have assessed those requirements. As the court explained, patent
misuse doctrine “arose before there was any significant body of federal antitrust law,
and reached maturity long before that law . . . attained its present broad scope.”
78
Now,
however, when antitrust reaches “every practice that could impair competition
substantially, it is not easy to define a separate role for a doctrine also designed to
prevent an anticompetitive practice—the abuse of a patent monopoly.”
79
Indeed, “[i]f
misuse claims are not tested by conventional antitrust principles, by what principles
shall they be tested? Our law is not rich in alternative concepts of monopolistic abuse;
and it is rather late in the day to try to develop one without in the process subjecting the
rights of patent holders to debilitating uncertainty.”
80
Thus, there could be no patent
misuse without proof of the power or effect that antitrust law generally requires when
addressing such conduct.
Three IP practices closely related to ties have provoked some controversy as well. These are
package licensing of patents; blanket licenses, mainly of copyrighted recorded music; and block
booking of movies or television shows. Somewhat irrationally, package licensing and blanket
licensing are usually addressed under the rule of reason, while block booking is unlawful per se. See 1
HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 5, at ch. 22.
74. Senza-Gel Corp. v. Seiffhart, 803 F.2d 661 (Fed. Cir. 1986). On the antitrust requirement of separate
tying and tied products, see 10 AREEDA ET AL., supra note 3, at ch. 17D-1.
75. Transitron Elec. Corp. v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 487 F. Supp. 885, 892-93 (D. Mass. 1980), aff’d, 649
F.2d 871 (1st Cir. 1981) (“patent misuse may be seen as having a less stringent standing requirement
and a lesser burden of proof than an antitrust claim”); Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb, 882
F.2d 1556, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“When a party seeks to collect monetary damages from a patentee
because of alleged violations of the antitrust laws, it is appropriate to require a higher degree of
misconduct for that damage award than when a party asserts only a defense against an infringement
claim.”). On copyright misuse, see Lasercomb Am. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 973, 979 (4th Cir.
1990) (“a misuse need not be a violation of antitrust law in order to comprise an equitable defense to
an infringement action”).
76. USM Corp. v. SPS Techs., 694 F.2d 505 (7th Cir. 1982).
77. Id. at 510.
78. Id. at 511.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 512.
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Recently, however, the courts have found occasion to give misuse a broader
meaning, particularly in cases involving copyright. For example, in Alcatel the
infringement plaintiff and defendant bothmade a “switch” that employed the plaintiff’s
copyrighted software.
81
The defendant could test its switch for compatibility only by a
single loading of the plaintiff’s software, which it refused to grant. When the plaintiff
claimed infringement, the court viewed the action as attempting to use the copyright
laws to limit competition in the market for the switches.
82
In its Assessment
Technologies decision, the Seventh Circuit also indicated that the scope of copyright
misuse could be broader than antitrust where the owner of a copyrighted database
attempted to use its copyright to “sequester” public domain information (public property
tax data) that was accessible only through the database.
83
Posner appeared to accept a
tort (abuse of process) theory rather than an antitrust theory of copyright misuse, at least
in principle:
The argument for applying copyright misuse beyond the bounds of antitrust, besides the
fact that confined to antitrust the doctrine would be redundant, is that for a copyright
owner to use an infringement suit to obtain property protection, here in data, that
copyright law clearly does not confer, hoping to force a settlement or even achieve an
outright victory over an opponent that may lack the resources or the legal sophistication to
resist effectively, is an abuse of process.
84
81. Alcatel USA v. DGI Techs., 166 F.3d 772, 792-94 (5th Cir. 1999).
82. See also Practice Mgmt. Info. Corp. v. AMA, 121 F.3d 516 (9th Cir. 1997) (when defendant
conditioned use of its copyrighted coding system on licensee’s promise not to use a competing coding
system, it engaged in copyright misuse, whether or not the agreement constituted an antitrust
violation); In re Napster Copyright Litig., 191 F. Supp. 2d 1087 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (copyright misuse
does not require a showing of an antitrust violation).
83. Assessment Techs., LLC v.WIREdata, Inc., 350 F.3d 640 (7th Cir. 2003), Assessment Techs., LLCv.
WIREdata, Inc., 361 F.3d 434 (7th Cir. 2004).
84. Assessment Technologies, 350 F.3d at 647. A subsequent decision then held that while the copyright
holder’s actions in seeking to use copyright law to deny access to public domain information may not
have constituted a technical misuse, they came sufficiently close to warrant an award of attorney’s fees
to the prevailing infringement defendant. Assessment Technologies, 361 F.3d 434. See also
Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Technologies, Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2004), holding
that the defendant’s universal garage door transmitter that allowed consumers to access copyrighted
software embedded in the manufacturer’s garage door openers did not violate the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act’s (DMCA’s) anticircumvention provisionwhen the access in questionwas undoubtedly
fair use:
Chamberlain’s [the copyright holder’s] construction of the DMCA would allow virtually any
company to attempt to leverage its sales into aftermarket monopolies—a practice that both the
antitrust laws, and the doctrine of copyright misuse, normally prohibit.
Id. at 437 (citing Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 455 (1992), and
Assessment Technologies, 350 F.3d at 647). As the court explained:
Chamberlain’s proposed construction would allow any manufacturer of any product to add a
single copyrighted sentence or software fragment to its product, wrap the copyrighted material
in a trivial “encryption” scheme, and thereby gain the right to restrict consumers’ rights to use
its products in conjunction with competing products.
Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1201.
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Despite its dubious history, IP misuse appears to be well established in legal
doctrine, and it continues to have a life beyond antitrust liability. The recent copyright
decisions appear to view it as a way of limiting overreaching that the Copyright Act
does not expressly prohibit but that seem unwise as a matter of competition policy. One
explanation of the divergence between copyright and patent misuse doctrine is that
copyright has no equivalent of Section 271(d) of the Patent Act, which operates tomake
patent misuse doctrine conformmore closely to antitrust principles, particularly in cases
where the challenged practice resembles tying.
85
5. The development of horizontal IP restraints doctrine
86
A restraint is horizontal if the participants are actual or potential competitors and the
restraint is designed to limit competition among the participants. Since the early
twentieth century, the Supreme Court has evaluated many types of horizontal restraints
involving IP rights, including price fixing and patent pools, various types of market
division, boycotts, and mergers. This section provides a verybrief evaluation of the law.
Certainly the longest running and most controversial horizontal restraint doctrine
involving patents is the one first articulated by the Supreme Court in 1902
87
and then
developedmore fully in the 1926General Electric case.
88
InGE the Court approved an
agreement between a patentee of incandescent light bulbs and its licensee, stipulating the
price that the licensee must charge for bulbs manufactured under the license. Because
the parties were actual competitors GE stands for the proposition that price fixing
between two rivals is lawful if the price-fixing provision is contained in a license from
the patentee permitting the licensee to produce the patented article. The Justice
Department has been vehemently hostile to the GE rule and has sought many times to
have it overruled but has never been able to do better than obtain a 4-4 split affirming a
lower court decision following the rule.
89
Recently Posner opined that the Supreme
Court would not follow the rule if the proper case came up today;
90
however, the rule
remains good law and has been applied as recently as 1993.
91
Worse yet, it seems clear from the facts that the patents were of doubtful value to
Westinghouse. The royalty rate was only 2 percent, and at the time of the agreement
85. See, in particular, 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(5), which provides that:
No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement or contributory infringement of a
patent shall be denied relief or deemed guilty of misuse or illegal extension of the patent right
by reason of his having . . . (5) conditioned the license of any rights to the patent or the sale of
the patented product on the acquisition of a license to rights in another patent or purchase of a
separate product, unless, in view of the circumstances, the patent owner hasmarket power in the
relevant market for the patent or patented product on which the license or sale is conditioned.
86. For other discussion, see 1 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 5, at chs. 30-36.
87. E. Bement & Sons v. Nat’l Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70 (1902).
88. United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926).
89. United States v. Huck Mfg. Co., 227 F. Supp. 791 (E.D. Mich. 1964), aff’d, 382 U.S. 197 (1965)
(affirmed by an equally divided Court). See also United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287,
302, 304, 316 (1948), in which four justices (Douglas, Black, Murphy, and Rutledge) opined that GE
should be overruled, and one (Jackson) did not participate.
90. Asahi Glass Co. v. Pentech Pharms., 289 F. Supp. 2d 986, 992 (N.D. Ill. 2003).
91. LucasArts Entm’t Co. v. Humongous Entm’t Co., 870 F. Supp. 285 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
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some 7 percent of the market was controlled by unlicensed manufacturers.
92
One
significantly anticompetitive aspect of theGE rule is its propensity to permit competitors
to cloak price fixing in a license agreement of dubious value, perhaps because the patent
is invalid, but perhaps simply because it would be quite easy for the licensee to develop
alternative technology that did not infringe the patent. The story of far too many GE-
style price-fixing agreements is that they were negotiated as settlements to patent
infringement suits that were of course never resolved.
For this reason both the Supreme Court and the lower courts have limited GE to the
circumstances of that case. For example, GE does not protect price fixing in a finished
product where the patents in question involve only a small portion of that product.
93
Nor
doesGE protect price fixing in the unpatented products produced bya patentedmachine
or process that has been licensed out.
94
The Supreme Court has also declined to extend
the GE rule to more elaborate arrangements in which a large number of patentees
licensed one another and fixed the prices in their industry
95
or to situations where
numerous owners of complementary patents licensed each other and included a price-
fixing provision in the arrangement.
96
Lower courts have tended to readGE even more
narrowly. For example, Newburgh Moire held that GE should be confined to its facts,
which were that a single patentee fixed patents with a single licensee. If three or more
parties were involved, theGE rule would not be applied.
97
Most recently, in Applera, a
district court conducted a lengthy analysis of the doctrine’s jurisprudence and concluded
that GE did not immunize industry-wide price fixing carried on via a licensing
agreement.
98
Finally, the first sale doctrine dictates that any protection given to price fixing by the
Patent Act cover only the initial sale of the patented good. As a result, the patentee
cannot fix the resale price of goods manufactured under a patent.
99
Significantly, the
92. See Asahi Glass, 289 F. Supp at 992; LANDES& POSNER, supra note 10, at 382-85.
93. Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436, 456 (1940) (agreement licensingEthyl, a gasoline
additive, did not warrant price fixing in the finished gasoline); United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316
U.S. 241 (1942) (licensing agreement involving raw lens blanks for bifocals did not warrant price
fixing in finished lenses).
94. Cummer-Graham Co. v. Straight Side Basket Corp., 142 F.2d 646, 647 (5th Cir. 1944) (GE did not
protect arrangement under which patentee licensed out patented attachment to basket-makingmachine,
and stipulated the resale price of baskets produced by it); Barber-Colman Co. v. Nat’l Tool Co., 136
F.2d 339 (6th Cir. 1943); Am. Equip. Co. v. Tuthill Bldg. Material Co., 69 F.2d 406 (7th Cir. 1934).
95. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 400 (1948), concluding that GE
gives no support for a patentee, acting in concert with all members of an industry, to issue
substantially identical licenses to all members of the industry under the terms of which the
industry is completely regimented, the production of competitive unpatented products
suppressed, a class of distributors squeezed out, and prices on unpatented products stabilized.
Accord United States v. New Wrinkle, Inc., 342 U.S. 371 (1952).
96. United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287 (1948).
97. Newburgh Moire Co. v. Superior Moire Co., 237 F.2d 283, 291-94 (3d Cir. 1956). Not all circuits
have agreed. SeeWestinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Bulldog Elec. Prods. Co., 179 F.2d 139, 143 (4th Cir.
1950) (refusing to adopt two-party restriction).
98. Applera Corp. v. MJ Research, 2004 WL 2935820, at *7-8, 2004-2 Trade Cases (CCH) ¶ 74,654 (D.
Conn. 2004).
99. E.g., Bauer & Cie v. O’Donnell, 229 U.S. 1 (1913).
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protection is lost even though the price-fixing provision in question is not resale price
maintenance either. For example, suppose GE licenses Westinghouse to make bulbs.
Westinghouse sells the bulbs to distributors, and GEmakes its license conditional on its
obtaining an agreement with all of these distributors stipulating their resale price. In this
case there is no resale price maintenance on GE’s part because there is no resale—the
transaction between GE andWestinghouse covers a patent license,while the transaction
between Westinghouse and the distributors covers the bulb. Further, there is no resale
price maintenance as between Westinghouse and the distributors because GE, not
Westinghouse, has stipulated the resale price. The agreement is nevertheless unlawful
per se.
Market division agreements involving IP rights have always received less hostile
treatment from the courts than have price-fixing agreements. First of all, some market
divisions are expressly permitted by the Patent Act. Section 261 authorizes a patentee to
grant an exclusive license covering “the whole or any specified part of the United
States.”
100
This provision has generally been viewed as permitting horizontal territorial
division agreements of the type that the Supreme Court declared to be unlawful per se in
its Topco decision, which did not involve patent licenses.
101
Importantly, while the
language permits a horizontal market division agreement between a patentee and its
individual licensees, it does not authorize competing licensees to negotiate exclusive
territories with each other, and such agreements would presumably be illegal per se if
naked, or subject to the rule of reason if reasonably ancillary to other joint productive
activity. That is to say, the right refers to formally “vertical” arrangements in which the
patentee-licensor is agreeing individually with licensees. Of course the agreement may
be horizontal in effect if the patentee is producing in competition with its licensees; but
that arrangement is somewhat akin to “dual distribution” in the vertical restraints
context, and todaymost such arrangements are analyzed under the rule of reason in any
event.
102
Customer and product allocation agreements do not enjoy the express IP
authorization that territorial agreements have. However, if the agreements are strictly
between a patentee and its individual licensees they will be treated as “field of use”
restrictions, and these are subject to the rule of reason and generally lawful. For
example, inGeneral Talking Pictures the patentee owned technology for making sound
amplifiers.
103
It reserved to itself and its subsidiaries the market for commercial sound
systems but licensed to others the right to manufacture sound systems for home use. A
100. 35 U.S.C. § 261.
101. United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596 (1972); see, e.g., E. Bement & Sons v. Nat’l Harrow
Co., 186 U.S. 70, 92-93 (1902) (upholding territorial restrictions in license agreement to make
agricultural harrows); Brownell v. Ketcham Wire & Mfg. Co., 211 F.2d 121, 128 (9th Cir. 1954)
(“owner of a patent may license another and prescribe territorial limitations”); Smith Int’l v.
Kennametal, Inc., 621 F. Supp. 79, 89-90 (N.D. Ohio 1985). The rule also applies to sublicensors and
sublicensees. SeeMiller Insituform, Inc. v. Insituform of N. Am., Inc., 605 F. Supp. 1125, 1130 (M.D.
Tenn. 1985), aff’d, 830 F.2d 606 (6th Cir. 1987) (permitting licensee to sublicense and impose
territorial restrictions on sublicensee).
102. On dual distribution, which occurs when a supplier sells in competition with its distributors or dealers,
see 8 AREEDA&HOVENKAMP, supra note 15, ¶ 1605.
103. Gen. Talking Pictures Corp. v. W. Elec. Co., 304 U.S. 175, aff’d on reh’g, 305 U.S. 124 (1938).
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naked agreement between competing firms dividing markets in this fashion would
ordinarily be unlawful per se, but ever sinceGeneral Talking Pictures the rule of reason
has been applied to most market division provisions of this type when contained in IP
licenses, even if the licensor and licensee are competitors.
104
More complex licensing provisions, including patent pools, generally receive rule of
reason treatment,
105
unless the court views them as disguises for naked price fixing.
106
Indeed, pooling may be essential to development when different firms have patents
whose claims overlap, or “block,” one another, making it impossible for any single firm
to practice its patent, at least for some particular purpose, without a license from
others.
107
Finally, standard setting arrangements are generally treated under the rule of
reason.
108
In general, markets for complex products work ore efficiently if product
standards are developed and effectively communicated to consumers.
109
One
competitive danger of standard setting is price fixing, which can become easier when a
product is standardized. A few standard-setting agreements have been condemned under
the per se rule when their obvious purpose was to facilitate price fixing.
110
Probably the
more significant danger is anticompetitive exclusion, which occurs when standard
setting is used by dominant firms to exclude the products of price cutters, or products
that threaten to shift market share away from dominant firms.
111
Finally, a few recent
cases have involved claims that a member of a standard setting organizationmanipulated
the process in such a manner as to facilitate the adoption of a standard over which it held
patent claims, thus enabling it to obtain royalties from those who manufactured under
the standard or perhaps excluding them altogether.
112
104. When the licensor and licensee are not competitors such arrangements are closely akin to vertical
nonprice restraints, which have been analyzed under the rule of reason since the Supreme Court’s
decision in Continental T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
105. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. (Ind.) v. United States, 283 U.S. 163 (1931); see also 1 HOVENKAMP ET
AL., supra note 5, at ch. 34.
106. E.g., Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386 (1945); United States v. Line Material Co.,
333 U.S. 287 (1948).
107. See 1 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 5, at ch. 34.
108. See id. at ch. 35.
109. See 13 HERBERTHOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 2230 (2d ed. 2005).
110. E.g., Nat’l MacaroniMfrs. Ass’n v. FTC, 345 F.2d 421 (7th Cir. 1965) (defendant’s fixed standard for
macaroni as 50% semolina hard wheat and 50% inferior farina wheat in order to suppress price of
semolina); C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co. v. United States, 197 F.2d 489 (9th Cir. 1952) (defendant’s
standardized fire extinguishers in order to facilitate bid rigging); see 13HOVENKAMP, supra note 109,
¶ 2136.
111. E.g., Allied Tube&Conduit Corp. v. IndianHead, Inc., 486 U.S. 492 (1988) (dominant maker of steel
conduit packed meeting of standard-setting organization in order to obtain disapproval of rival’s highly
innovative plastic conduit); Hydrolevel Corp. v. Am. Soc’y of Mech. Eng’rs, 456 U.S. 556 (1982)
(similar); Radiant Burners v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961) (accepting
allegations that gas utility companies and rival burner makers adopted standard that excluded
plaintiff’s burner); see 13 HOVENKAMP, supra note 109, ¶¶ 2230-2235.
112. Rambus Inc. v. Infineon Techs. AG, 318 F.3d 1081 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see also Union Oil Co., F.T.C.
Docket No. 9305, 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 15,618 (F.T.C. 2004); Rambus, Inc., 5 Trade Reg. Rep.
(CCH) ¶ 15,556 (F.T.C. 2004); Dell Computer Corp., 121 F.T.C. 616 (1996).
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6. Patents and exclusion
113
Like all exclusionary practices, those involving intellectual property rights require
the plaintiff to show that the defendant has monopoly power (or, in attempt cases, a
dangerous probability of acquiring it), and one or more anticompetitive “exclusionary”
practices. Undoubtedly the most commonly litigated of these is Walker Process-style
complaints that the monopolist patentee is attempting to enforce a patent that is invalid
because it was improperly obtained, has subsequently become unenforceable, or where
the patentee should have known that the monopolist’s unilateral refusal to license a
patent has created some controversy and a split in the circuit courts. Courts have
regarded with even greater suspicion claims that patented innovation itself constitutes an
unlawful exclusionary practice.
6.1. Walker Process and exclusionary infringement actions
While the Supreme Court’s 1965 decision in Walker Process
114
is sometimes
identified as the historical basis for applying Section 2 of the Sherman Act to unilateral
exclusionary practices involving IP rights, the case law actually stretches earlier. For
example, in Besser (1952) the Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s conclusion
that the defendant violated Section 2 by filing a patent infringement suit without any
good knowledge whether the infringement defendant’s technologyactually infringed the
patent.
115
A few other decisions condemned practices, such as patent accumulation that
was thought to be excessive. For example, in United Shoe Machinery Judge Charles
Wyzanski found it unlawful for USM to accumulate many patents by obtaining
exclusive rights from the patentee when it could just as easily have obtained
nonexclusive rights.
116
The 1955 report of the U.S. Attorney General also expressed a
concern about patent accumulation and Section 2, generally concluding thatwhile a firm
should be permitted to acquire as many patents as it pleased through its own internal
research, liability should attach to extreme cases of acquiring exclusive rights from
others.
117
Prior to Walker Process the law had been that fraud on the patent office could be
used as a defense in an infringement action based on such a patent.
118
However, already
inMowry v. Whitney (1872) the Supreme Court had adopted the English rule that only
113. See 3 PHILLIP E. AREEDA&HERBERTHOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶¶ 704-711 (2d ed. 2002).
114. Walker Process Equip. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965).
115. United States v. Besser Mfg. Co., 96 F. Supp. 304, 312 (E.D. Mich. 1951), aff’d, 343 U.S. 444 (1952)
(lawsuits on machine alleged to infringe but that patentee had never examined; the defendants were
actually Besser and its partially owned subsidiary Stearns, of which Besser owned some 40% and
controlled three of five board members; court dealt with claim under both § 2 and § 1).
116. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 310-12, 333 (D. Mass. 1953), aff’d per
curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
117. REPORTOF THEATTORNEYGENERAL’SNATIONALCOMMITTEETOSTUDYTHEANTITRUSTLAWS 226
(1955).
118. See, e.g., Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 816-17 (1945)
(barring enforcement of patent obtained by fraud; patentee became aware of fraud during the course of
litigation); KeystoneDriller v. Gen. Excavator Co., 290U.S. 240 (1933) (patentee suppressed evidence
of prior use that rendered patent unenforceable; improperly maintained infringement action).
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the government could bring an affirmative action to have a patent set aside on grounds
of fraud.
119
Because the infringement defendant’s antitrust counterclaim in Walker
Process required an affirmative attack on the patent, the lower courts had dismissed the
complaint. The Court did not overruleMowry but rather distinguished between actions
brought under the Patent Act to set aside a patent for fraud, which only the government
could bring, and actions brought under a collateral statute such as the antitrust laws.
120
As a practical matter, a factual holding in an antitrust counterclaim that a patent had
been fraudulently obtained renders the patent unenforceable as against any party to that
proceeding.
In general, the courts have readWalker Process quite restrictively,
121
and with good
reason. Almost any attempt at enforcing a patent through threatened or actual
infringement lawsuits could yield an antitrust counterclaim if strict standards are not
applied, and this could serve to make patents less attractive and far more costly to
defend. The owner of a patent must have some assurance about its rights to protect its
investment.
There is also a significant question about the need for a separate Section 2 remedy
for fraudulently brought infringement actions. The Patent Act itself, coupled with a set
of broad equity rulings, creates significant remedies addressing such situations. Patents
obtained by fraud or inequitable conduct before the PTO are unenforceable.
122
The
Supreme Court has even held that fraud in the application for one patent may render
related patents unenforceable.
123
As noted previously, the government may sue to
cancel a patent obtained by fraud,
124
and judgments of invalidity for fraud or
misrepresentation are generally given nonmutual collateral estoppel effect in subsequent
actions brought by other licensees.
125
A licensee under a patent determined to be
unenforceable for fraud or inequitable conduct may escape payment of future
119. Mowry v. Whitney, 14 Wall. 434 (1872). As an example of such an action, see United States v.
American Bell Telephone Co., 128 U.S. 315 (1888) (government may sue to set aside patent obtained
by fraud; here, on claims that Bell knowingly applied for patent improvements on telephonewhen such
improvements had been developed by others and were already in commercial use).
120. Indeed, the Court noted, it was already well established that a patent’s validity could be challenged
under the Declaratory Judgment Act. SeeWalker Process Equip. v. FoodMach. & Chem. Corp., 382
U.S. 172, 176 (1965).
121. For example, the Federal Circuit, as well as some other circuits, require clear and convincing evidence
of patent fraud. FMC Corp. v. Manitowoc Co., 835 F.2d 1411 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Loctite Corp. v.
Ultraseal Ltd., 781 F.2d 861 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Handgards v. Ethicon (Handgards I), 601 F.2d 986 (9th
Cir. 1979).
122. Precision Instrument, 324 U.S. 806 (barring enforcement of patent obtained by fraud); J.P. Stevens &
Co. v. Lex Tex, 747 F.2d 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (same; patent obtained by inequitable conduct in
patent application process); see alsoHewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch&Lomb, 882 F.2d 1556 (Fed. Cir.
1989) (fraud or inequitable conduct in application for reissue patent rendered original patent
unenforceable); Kingsdown Med. Consultants v. Hollister, 863 F.2d 867 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (if
inequitable conduct occurs with respect to one significant claim in the patent application, the entire
patent becomes unenforceable).
123. Keystone Driller, 290 U.S. 240.
124. American Bell Tel. Co., 128 U.S. 315 (1888).
125. SeeBlonder-Tongue Labs. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1970). Onnonmutual, or “offensive,”
collateral estoppel in antitrust cases, see AREEDA&HOVENKAMP, supra note 62, ¶ 318.
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royalties
126
and, in cases of fraud, may recover previously paid royalties.
127
Further, the
licensee or infringement defendant who proves fraud or inequitable conductmay recover
attorney’s fees under the Patent Act itself.
128
Finally, as noted previously, if the patentee
is engaged in misuse the court can refuse to enforce the patent or compel payment of
royalties as long as the misuse persists.
129
So the need for yet another remedy under the antitrust laws is hardly a forgone
conclusion, particularly since antitrust damages in such cases are typically not large.
The most obvious damages are the infringement defendant/antitrust counterclaimant’s
litigation costs. To be sure, there may be collateral damages for such things as loss of
sales prior to the court’s determination of invalidity. In addition is the belief that a
single infringement suit is an unlikely vehicle for creating or perpetuating durable
monopoly, although there may be exceptions.
Nonetheless, the “Walker Process” antitrust counterclaim iswell established, and the
courts consider several such claims annually.
130
Further, the doctrine has expanded
beyondWalker Process to reach situations where the infringement suit itself, rather than
the means by which the patent was procured, is improper. An infringement action can
be objectively baseless because the infringement plaintiff is stating a claim that is
contrary to the law
131
or where the action is improper for some other reason, such as the
patent’s expiration, or the patentee’s knowledge that the infringement defendant’s
technology does not infringe any claim in the relevant patent.
132
Today, much of the law governing such claims is made by the U.S. Court ofAppeals
for the Federal Circuit.
133
In Nobelpharma the Federal Circuit held that it would make
its own antitrust law for such counterclaims insofar as the issues were intimately related
with patent law.
134
However, for issues such as relevant market, market power, or
126. Lear v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969).
127. USM Corp. v. SPS Techs., 514 F. Supp. 213 (N.D. Ill. 1981), rev’d on other grounds, 694 F.2d 505
(7th Cir. 1982); Transitron Elec. Corp. v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 649 F.2d 871, 875-76 (1st Cir. 1981)
(requiring knowing misrepresentation made to Patent Office at time of application).
128. See 35 U.S.C. § 285; see also Fox Indus. v. Structural Preservation Sys., 922 F.2d 801, 804 (Fed. Cir.
1990) (recovery of attorney’s fees by infringement defendant); Monolith Portland Midwest Co. v.
Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 407 F.2d 288 (9th Cir. 1969) (same).
129. Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942).
130. See 3 AREEDA&HOVENKAMP, supra note 113, ¶¶ 705-706.
131. See for example, Professional Real Estate Investors v. Columbia Pictures Industries, 508 U.S. 49
(1993), which recognized the possibility that a copyright infringement suit that was improperly
brought because contrary to law could be an antitrust violation, although not finding a violation in a
case where the circuits were divided on the legal question at issue.
132. See generally 3 AREEDA&HOVENKAMP, supra note 113, ¶ 705g, h.
133. In Holmes Group v. Vornado Air Circulation Systems, 535 U.S. 826 (2002), the Supreme Court held
that the jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit does not extend to counterclaims that arise under the Patent
Act. However, in the typicalWalker Process lawsuit the primary claim is an infringement suit under
the Patent Act, and the counterclaim is asserted under the antitrust laws, so the Federal Circuit
normally has jurisdiction over both claims. See, e.g., Atari v. JS&AGroup, 747 F.2d 1422 (Fed. Cir.
1984) (en banc); see also 1 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 5, at ch. 5; CHARLES ALANWRIGHT,
ARTHURR.MILLER&EDWARDH. COOPER, FEDERALPRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4104 (Juris. 2d
1988 & Supp.).
134. Nobelpharma v. Implant Innovations, 141 F.3d 1059 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
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damages, which are general to all types of antitrust claims, the Federal Circuit would
follow the law of the regional circuit where the case originated.
135
Today antitrust counterclaims to infringement actions are asserted for both patent and
copyright infringement suits, although the former are far more common. Many types of
defects in the infringement claim can serve as the conduct basis for the counterclaim.
This includes situations where the IP holder knows that the claimed IP right is invalid or
unenforceable,
136
where the infringement plaintiff is relying on an irrational
interpretation of the statute,
137
where the underlying IP right is valid but the claim does
not cover the infringement defendant’s technology,
138
or where the IP right upon which
the claim is asserted has expired.
139
The improper filing of the infringement action establishes the conduct element of the
antitrust counterclaim. However, in order to prove a Section 2 violation the antitrust
counterclaimant will also have to prove other essential elements of an antitrust claim,
including monopoly power (or the dangerous probability of acquiring it in an attempt
case), anticompetitive effects, standing under Section 4 of the Clayton Act, and
damages.
140
6.2. Unilateral refusals to license
As a basic premise, the owner of a patent or other IP interest is free to practice the
invention itself, or to license it or refuse to license it. This general rule applies even to
unused or “unworked” patents. Early in the twentieth century a few courts held that
patent doctrine (not antitrust law) limited the patent infringement plaintiff to damages if
the infringement involved an unused patent.
141
That remedy was effectively a form of
compulsory licensing with judicially determined damages as the royalty. However, in
its 1908 Paper Bag case the Supreme Court held that even the owner of an unused
135. Id. at 1068. Thus, for example, in Independent Ink v. Illinois Tool Works, 396 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir.
2005), rev’d and remanded, 126 S. Ct. 1281 (2006), the Federal Circuit held that it would apply
Federal Circuit law to the issue of tying legalitywhen the tying product is patented; however, it would
apply regional circuit law to the question of market power measurement.
136. E.g., Open LCR.Com v. Rates Tech., 112 F. Supp. 2d 1223 (D. Colo. 2000) (plaintiff’s allegations that
patentee failed to disclose prior art to the Patent and Trademark Office and then threatened and
brought infringement claims without realistic expectation of success on merits, even after antitrust
plaintiff documented the existence of the prior art, were sufficient to support antitrust action).
137. Cf. Prof’l Real Estate Investors v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 508 U.S. 49 (1993).
138. E.g., United States v. Besser Mfg. Co., 96 F. Supp. 304, 312 (E.D. Mich. 1951), aff’d, 343 U.S. 444
(1952); cf. Ecrix Corp. v. Exabyte Corp., 95 F. Supp. 2d 1155 (D. Colo. 2000) (for purposes of filing
antitrust claim, infringement defendant was entitled to discovery of factual basis for infringement
plaintiff’s allegations that former’s technology infringed the latter’s patent).
139. E.g., Int’l Techs. Consultants v. Pilkington PLC, 137 F.3d 1382 (9th Cir. 1998).
140. See 1A AREEDA&HOVENKAMP, supra note 7, ¶ 208.
141. Elec. Smelting & Aluminum Co. v. Carborundum Co., 189 F. 710 (C.C.W.D. Pa. 1900); Dorsey
Harvester Revolving Rake Co. v. Marsh, 7 F. Cas. 939, 945 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1873). The rationale of
these early decisions was that because the patentee was not working the patent it was not in
competition with the infringer, and therefore the ordinary damages remedy at law was adequate.
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patent could enjoin infringement.
142
Since then the right, insofar as patent law is
concerned, has been codified:
No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement or contributory infringement
of a patent shall be denied relief or deemed guilty of misuse or illegal extension of the
patent right by reason of his having . . . (4) refused to license or use any rights to the
patent.
143
The language “misuse or illegal extension of the patent right” would seem broad
enough to cover both misuse and antitrust claims.
144
However, in its 1997 Kodak
decision, discussed below, the Ninth Circuit held to the contrary, declaring that a refusal
to license patented parts was a violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act.
145
When considering antitrust policy and any duty to license IP rights, one must
distinguish four situations: (1) concerted refusals to license, (2) “conditional” refusals to
license, (3) compulsory licensing imposed as a remedy for separately proven antitrust
violations, and (4) the unilateral refusal to license as an antitrust violation itself.
Concerted refusals to license are addressed under the antitrust’s per se rule if they are
“naked” boycotts in which the boycotting firms are competitors
146
and under the rule of
reason if they are ancillary to joint productive activity.
147
A conditional refusal to license can be an antitrust violation if the condition violates
the antitrust laws. For example, Section 3 of the Clayton Act provides:
It shall be unlawful . . . to lease or make a sale . . . of goods, wares, merchandise,
machinery, supplies, or other commodities, whether patented or unpatented . . . on the
condition, agreement, or understanding that the lessee or purchaser thereof shall not use or
deal in the goods . . . of a competitor.
148
That is to say, an agreement to license a patent only if the licensee agrees to tying or
exclusive dealing is unlawful if the underlying tying or exclusive dealing is unlawful.
Likewise, a price-fixing agreement among patentees is effectively an agreement not to
license unless the licensee pays the fixed price. Or a willingness to licensee technology
only on the condition that the licensee not develop competing technology might be
either an exclusionary practice under the Sherman Act or misuse.
149
One could go on
142. Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 429 (1908).
143. 35 U.S.C. § 271d.
144. For the same reason, it would seem clear that a patent could not be an essential facility. Recognizing it
as such would simply be compulsory licensing by another name. See 1 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra
note 5, at § 13.3c.
145. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 125 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 1997).
146. However, under the Supreme Court’s decision in NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, 525 U.S. 128 (1998), so-
called purely vertical boycotts must be addressed under the rule of reason. For example, an agreement
between a patentee and a licensee not to license a second licensee would be addressed under the rule of
reason as an output contract, at least assuming that the patentee and licensee are not competing in
production of the patented good. See 13 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 5, ¶ 2204.
147. See 13 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 5, ¶ 2214 (closed membership joint ventures), ¶¶ 2221-2223
(open membership ventures).
148. 15 U.S.C. § 14.
149. E.g., Lasercomb Am. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 973, 979 (4th Cir. 1990) (copyright misuse for
infringement plaintiff to license database only on condition that licensee not develop a competing
database).
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with this list, but the basic point should be clear: conditional refusals to deal are
addressed under ordinary antitrust principles and in most cases an unlawful refusal is not
saved by the fact that the subject of the refusal is an IP right.
Compulsory licensing is also a fairly common remedy for an independently proven
antitrust violation—that is, where the violation is something other than the refusal to
license itself.
150
One controversial issue concerning refusals to license is whether the unilateral
refusal to license an IP right can itself be an unlawful exclusionary practice or constitute
misuse of the right. With few exceptions the federal courts have consistently held that a
patentee has no duty to license its patent to others.
151
Further, as noted previously, that
duty has been enacted into the patent statute, as least insofar as misuse claims are
concerned.
152
The issue would be regarded as settled but for the Ninth Circuit’s Kodak decision
upon remand from the Supreme Court.
153
First, that court held that Section 271(d)
simply declared preexisting law; and while that law had never compelled licensing, the
150. See, e.g., United States v. Glaxo Group, 410 U.S. 52 (1973); Besser Mfg. Co. v. United States, 343
U.S. 444, 449 (1952) (“We can see no abuse of discretion here. Compulsory licensing and sale of
patented devices are recognized remedies. Theywould seem particularly appropriatewhere, as here, a
penchant for abuses of patent rights is demonstrated.”); United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 115 F. Supp.
835 (D.N.J. 1953). And see the following consent decrees: United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131,
136 (D.D.C.1982), aff’d mem. sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983) (AT&T
breakup, requiringAT&T to grant the seven “babyBells” nonexclusive licenses to its patents); United
States v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 556 F. Supp. 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (consent decree containing detailed
licensing requirements), rev’d on other grounds, 719 F.2d 558 (2d Cir. 1983); cf. Int’l Tel. & Tel.
Corp. v. Gen. Tel. & Elec., 351 F. Supp. 1153, 1175 (D. Haw. 1972), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on
other grounds, 518 F.2d 913 (9th Cir. 1975) (discussing earlier AT&T consent decree involving
Western Electric subdivision, which also required compulsory licensing of patents).
151. SeeCont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 429 (1908); Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm
& Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 215 (1980) (“the right to exclude others from profiting by the patented
invention” is “essence” of patent); Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147 (1st
Cir. 1994); Genentech v. Eli Lilly & Co., 998 F.2d 931, 949 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Miller Insituform v.
Insituform of N. Am., 830 F.2d 606, 609 (6th Cir. 1987) (refusing to license cannot be § 2 violation);
SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1204, 1206 (2d Cir. 1981) (“[n]o court has ever held that
the antitrust laws require a patent holder to forfeit the exclusionary power inherent in his patent the
instant his patent monopoly affords him monopoly power over a relevant product market”); United
States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 648 F.2d 642, 647 (9th Cir. 1980) (patentee has “untrammeled
right” to refuse to license; antitrust violation may not be found “where a patent holder does precisely
that which the patent laws authorize”); W.L. Gore &Assocs. v. Carlisle Corp., 529 F.2d 614, 623 (3d
Cir. 1976) (“right to refuse to license is the essence of the patent holder’s right”).
152. See supra text accompanying notes 142-43.
153. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 125 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 1997), on remand from
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 504 U.S. 451 (1992). The possibility that a unilateral
refusal to license could be unlawful was suggested earlier in dicta inData General Corp. v. Grumman
Systems Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1187 & n.64 (1st Cir. 1994) (unilateral refusal to license a
copyright can be unlawful exclusionary practice; however, “an author’s desire to exclude others from
use of its copyrighted work is a presumptively valid business justification for any immediate harm to
consumers”). See also 1 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 5, § 13.3d2.
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court concluded that this fact entitled it to consider the issue anew.
154
It then devised a
“single monopoly” theory for patents under which a patentee was entitled to one, but
only one, monopoly. The court reasoned that patents may have given Kodak a
monopoly on some of its parts, but by refusing to sell the parts to independent repair
technicians Kodak was effectively creating a second monopoly in the relevant market
for service.
155
As both the district court and the Federal Circuit later observed in the ISO
case, this single monopoly theory rests on a fundamental misconception about patents.
156
Patents describe inventions, not markets. A patent typically creates no monopoly at all,
but a few may create a monopoly in one market or in many depending on where and
how the patented technology is used. The Kodak patents on aftermarket parts were of
value in both the market for the parts themselves and the complementary market for
servicing photocopiers. This fact, as far as the Ninth Circuit was concerned, meant that
Kodak had a duty to sell its parts. Otherwise, it would be reaping the advantages of
monopoly in both the parts market and the service market. The Supreme Court denied
certiorari on both the Ninth Circuit and the Federal Circuit decisions, so this conflict in
the circuits persists.
Finally, Section 2 of the ShermanAct has also produced claims that innovation itself
is an exclusionary practice. This is an area where the antitrust laws must tread
particularly lightly because the defendant’s conduct is fully consistent with both the
language and the general policy purposes of the antitrust laws. Further, significant
innovations frequently injure rivals committed to older technologies, but it would be
economically counterproductive and contrary to the whole concept of IP rights to punish
people whose innovations injured a rival.
The relatively small number of cases posing direct challenges to innovation have
involved claims that (1) the inventor should have predisclosed technology so that rivals
could anticipate it and be prepared to accommodate it on the market, and (2) that the
innovation was unnecessarily harmful in that it conferred little or no benefit on
consumers but made a rival’s complementary product incompatible with the dominant
firm’s product.
In Berkey Photo the Second Circuit, while speaking expansively of antitrust duties
generally, held that a dominant manufacturer of camera film had no duty to predisclose
its new film and camera design so that competing manufacturers could anticipate and
make suitable modifications in their own products.
157
In general, the duty that the
plaintiff was asking the court to create would significantly impair the value of IP rights.
Further, there does not seem to be any effective way of managing it. By the time the
defendant releases its new technology, the requirement has already been violated. Prior
to market release the innovator would have to predict the impact of its innovation,
identify those persons who would be harmed by it, and determine their entitlement to
predisclosure. The almost certain result of such a rule would be paralyzing uncertainty
154. See Kodak, 125 F.3d at 1215.
155. Id. at 1215-16, 1225.
156. See In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 989 F. Supp. 1131, 1138 (D. Kan. 1989); In re Indep.
Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
157. Berkey Photo v. Eastman Kodak, 603 F.2d 263, 281 (2d Cir. 1979).
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for dominant firms involved in significant innovation.
158
Other predisclosure issues,
concerning things such as false predisclosures, or vaporware, are less clear cut.
However, in Microsoft the District of Columbia Circuit approved condemnation of
Microsoft for giving software developers false advance information leading them to
think they were writing for a version of the JAVA programming language that would
support multiple platforms, when it fact it supported only the Windows platform. The
result was to maintain Windows’ incompatibility with the platforms of rivals, and thus
its market dominating position.
159
Other plaintiffs have suggested that patented or copyrighted innovations themselves
are unlawful if they are unnecessarily exclusionary. Once again, the court that considers
such claims is in precarious territory. The more successful an innovation is, the more
harm it will do to the products of the competitors that it displaces, and any significant
threat of liability for innovating itself could create socially harmful disincentives to
invention. The courts have found liability only rarely, and then only where the
innovation was found to be of slight value to consumers but highly exclusionary to rivals
whose complimentary products were rendered incompatible. For example, the Federal
Circuit affirmed a verdict of liability in C.R. Bard when the defendant made minor
changes in its tissue sampling gun that rendered the disposable needles of rivals
incompatible and forced users to purchase the defendant’s patented needles.
160
Likewise,Microsoft condemned numerous efforts bywhich the defendant tried tomake
rival Internet browser Netscape less compatiblewith its copyrightedWindows operating
system.
161
7. Conclusion
The history of IP-antitrust litigation is filled with exaggerated notions of the power
conferred by IP rights and imagined threats to competition. The result is that antitrust
litigation involving IP practices has seen problems where none existed. To be sure,
finding the right balance between maintaining competition and creating incentives to
innovate is no easy task. However, the judge in an IP-antitrust case almost never needs
to do the balancing, most of which is done in the language of the IP provisions. The role
of antitrust tribunals is the much more limited one of ensuring that any alleged threat to
158. See 1 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 5, § 12.4a3.
159. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 76 (D.C. Cir. 2001). An earlier round of litigation had
also provoked a discussion of vaporware, but no liability. See Judge Sporkin’s opinion in United
States v. Microsoft Corp., 159 F.R.D. 318, 335 (D.D.C.), rev’d on other grounds, 56 F.3d 1448 (D.C.
Cir. 1995) (suggesting that aggressive preannouncement of new products could be exclusionary
because consumers might wait rather than shift to a rival’s product):
This Court cannot ignore the obvious. Here is the dominant firm in the software industry
admitting it “preannounces” products to freeze the current software market and thereby defeat
the marketing plans of competitors that have products ready for market. Microsoft admits that
the preannouncement is solely for the purpose of having an adverse impact on a competitor’s
product. Its counsel states it has advised its client that the practice is perfectly legal and it may
continue the practice. This practice of an alleged monopolist would seem to contribute to the
acquisition, maintenance, or exercise of market share.
160. C.R. Bard v. M3 Sys., 157 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
161. Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 66; see also 3 AREEDA&HOVENKAMP, supra note 113, ¶ 776.
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competition is real. At the same time, however, antitrust judges should not be reluctant
to condemn IP practices once a real threat to competition is found, unless the practice
has a clear justification in the IP statutes themselves or the explicit policies that the
Supreme Court has derived from those statutes.
